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Security is a principal concern in offering an infrastructure for the formation of
general-purpose computational grids. A number of grid implementations have been
devised to deal with the security concerns by authenticating the users, hosts and their
interactions in an appropriate fashion. Resource management systems that are
sophisticated and secured are inevitable for the efficient and beneficial deployment of
grid computing services. The chief factors that can be problematic in the secured
selection of grid resources are the wide range of selection and the high degree of
strangeness. Moreover, the lack of a higher degree of confidence relationship is likely
to prevent efficient resource allocation and utilisation. In this paper, we present an
efficient approach for the secured selection of grid resources, so as to achieve secure
execution of the jobs. This approach utilises trust and reputation for securely selecting
the grid resources. To start with, the self-protection capability and reputation weightage
of all the entities are computed, and based on those values, the trust factor (TF) of all
the entities are determined. The reputation weightage of an entity is the measure of both
the user’s feedback and other entities’ feedback. Those entities with higher TF values
are selected for the secured execution of jobs. To make the proposed approach more
comprehensive, a novel method is employed for evaluating the user’s feedback on the
basis of the existing feedbacks available regarding the entities. This approach is proved
to be scalable for an increased number of user jobs and grid entities.
The experimentation portrays that this approach offers desirable efficiency in the
secured selection of grid resources.
Keywords: grid computing; computational grids; security; resource management;
resource selection; trust
1. Introduction
The increasing quantity of resources prevailing in the Internet and the latest developments
in wide-area network performance have facilitated the emergence of grid computing as a
practical archetype to satisfy the growing demand for computation power that could not be
fulfilled with the aid of the internal resources of a single organisation [14]. The objective to
distribute processing resources amidst several organisations to resolve large-scale
problems has resulted in the introduction of computational grids [6,9,13,16]. A grid can be
termed as an ensemble of resources (computational devices, networks, online instruments,
storage archives, etc.) that can possibly be employed to achieve a common objective. Grids
have developed into widespread platforms for high-performance and resource-intensive
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applications due to the reason that they encompass vast potential of capabilities that can
assist large distributed applications [25]. A concept or methodology was intended towards
integrating a set of distributed resources that can be applied at various computer system
levels such as computation, data, software, agents, users and so on.
Despite providing pervasive, dependable, consistent and cost-effective access to the
diverse services offered by the distributed resources, grids are capable of supporting
problem-solving environments created with those resources [22]. Grid applications make
use of high-performance distributed resources such as high performance systems,
networks, databases and more. These distributed resources can be integrated with the aid
of grid middleware, for instance, Globus [12] and Gridbus [8]. The grid comprises
dynamic resources. The grid computing resources can be classified into various levels
ranging from a small number of large clusters (for instance, the TeraGrid [24]) to millions
of PC-class machines (for instance, SETI@Home [28]). The requirements of a powerful
grid system are dynamic allocation and dynamic release of resources. An assured trust can
be created in grid computing by accomplishing proper allocation of resources to ensure the
desired computing power and by enhancing the security of the resources [32].
Apprehensively, a significant challenge for grid computing is to build a comprehensive
set of mechanisms and policies for protecting the grid. Currently, the grid security research
and development focuses on creating improved solutions to meet the subsequent
requirements namely authentication, secure communication, effective security policies,
authorisation and access control. A wide variety of security functionality such as the
authentication, authorisation, credential conversion, auditing and delegation should be
supported by the applications and services of the grid environment to guarantee protection.
Grid applications necessitate interaction with the other applications and services, which
have an assortment of security mechanisms and requirements [2].
Resource and security assurance are the two fundamental requirements of grid
applications [7,38]. The solid problems underneath the grid concept include coordinated
resource sharing and problem resolving in dynamic, multi-institutional virtual
organisations [29]. Infected grid resources can probably wreck the applications running
on the same grid platform via the malicious codes designed by intruders. The apprehensive
sharing is not primarily file exchange, rather direct access to computers, software, data and
other resources that are essential for diverse collaborative problem-solving and resource-
brokering strategies emerging in industry, science and engineering [15]. A range of
phenomena including (a) geographical allocation of resources, (b) resource heterogeneity,
(c) autonomously managed grid domains comprising their own resource policies and
practices and (d) grid domains employing diverse access and cost models, generate huge
challenges for resource management in grid systems.
At present, security is integrated in the grid toolkits (e.g. the Globus toolkit [12])
employed at the provider sites (parties that provide resources for use in the grid). Secure
channels, authentication [5], unsupervised login, delegation and resource usage [15] are all
administered by the toolkit. However, these mechanisms do not offer security for the grid
user (the person or entity who desires to utilise resources). The user is forced to trust the
provider without confirming the justification of the trust [20]. Users submit jobs to far-off
resources and generally have no clear authority over the resources themselves. Therefore,
mutually the users and resources can be considered as independent agents, possessing control
of their own behaviour. The independence causes an increase in intrinsic insecurity owing to
the fact that an individual is not capable of predicting the response of another to varying
situations. It is essential that the grid service providers (GSPs) proffer guaranteed security,
privacy protection and dependable accessibility of all grid-enabling platforms [38].
V. Vijayakumar et al.2
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
1:3
7 0
5 J
uly
 20
12
 
Numerous grid computing environments emphasise their security concerns in
validating users and hosts and in the communications among them in a suitable manner.
The secure and efficient exploitation of the grid computing facilities necessitate advanced
and secured resource management systems. This accomplishment holds for both the
functional requirements and the non-functional ones. The wide range of selection and the
high degree of strangeness paves way for problems in secured grid resource selection.
Useful resource allocation and utilisation cannot be achieved without the assurance of a
higher degree of trust relationship. In recent times, reputation mechanisms are considered
as one of the most important techniques supporting the distributed application and system
safety for its enhanced scalability and robustness due to the enormous applications in e-
commerce and online communities. Grids are large-scale wide-area systems, which
consider trust as a chief concern. The existing generations of grid information services lack
the ability to establish how trustworthy a particular GSP or grid customer is likely to be [1].
Recently, incorporating trust and reputation into grid security mechanisms has gained
enormous popularity among researchers. Few researches have been proposed for providing
security in grid environments by employing trust and reputation [2–4,20,21,30–32]
including our previous works [34–36].
This paper discusses an effective approach for selecting grid resources on the basis of
trust and reputation to execute the jobs in a secured manner. Our earlier researches
[34–36] have been extended with a novel and effective approach presented for evaluating
user’s feedback. The chief objective of this research is to develop an approach that is
capable of availing trust-based and reputation-based security for grid resource selection
towards scheduling large number of independent and indivisible jobs. This approach
performs the scheduling of the incoming jobs in accordance with the computed trust factor
(TF) value. The feedback from user communities and the feedback received from other
entities in the grid are employed in determining an entity’s reputation weightage, which in
turn is utilised along with self-protection capability (SPC) to compute the entity’s TF
value. The ability of an entity to handle intrusions, viruses, unauthorised access and
secured file storage are denoted as SPC of that site. The reputation mechanisms provide a
way for building trust through social control using community-based feedback about past
experiences of entities. Besides, a novel approach is proposed for evaluating the user’s
feedback. The feedback given by a user about an entity is evaluated on the basis of the
aggregated feedback available about that entity. The experimental results demonstrate the
effectiveness of this approach in securely selecting the grid resources.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2, a concise review of the
recent researches related to this approach is presented. An overview of trust and reputation
in the context of grid computing is provided in Section 3. The proposed efficient approach
for secured grid resource selection and the devised novel approach for evaluating the
user’s feedback are explained in Section 4. The experimental results are presented in
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Review of related research
Numerous works in the literature dealing with trust management and reputation-based
security mechanisms for improving the performance of grid computing serve as the
motivation behind the proposed work. A brief review of some of those works is given below.
A formal definition of both trust and reputation was presented and a model for
incorporating trust into grid systems was discussed by Azzedin and Maheswaran [3]. An
overview of an open-source grid toolkit known as Gridbus, the architecture is fundamentally
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems 3
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driven by the requirements of grid economy which was carried out by Buyya and Venugopal
[8]. Gridbus technologies proffer services to both computational and data grids that control
the budding e-Science and e-Business applications. A self-regulating system for P2P
network that works on robust reputation mechanism was proposed by Damiani et al. [10].
They realised reputation sharing with the aid of the distributed polling algorithm. A general-
purpose resource selection framework was put forth by Liu et al. [19]. They have defined a
resource selection service for positioning grid resources that conform to application
requirements and evaluated them on the basis of specified performance model and mapping
strategies, and returned an appropriate collection of resources if any were present.
The Bayesian network-based trust model and a method for building reputation based
on recommendations in peer-to-peer networks were put forth by Wang and Vassileva [37].
Kamvar et al. [17] proposed a reputation management system known as EigenTrust, which
was capable of effectively decreasing the number of downloads of inauthentic files in a
P2P system. The reputation value of every peer is calculated with the aid of the number of
successful downloads and the ‘opinions’ of other peers. A novel fuzzy-logic trust model
for securing grid computing across multiple resources sites was devised by Song and
Hwang [30]. They built a novel grid security scheme known as SARAH supported by
encrypted channels amid private networks. Dyson et al. [11] illustrated a trust framework
model for grid computing that facilitates users to implement their jobs on reliable and
efficient resources, thus fulfilling clients’ quality-of-service requirements.
A trust brokering system that operates in a peer-to-peer fashion was proposed by Azzedin
and Maheswaran [4]. They built a security-aware model involving resource providers and
the consumers which segregates the concepts of accuracy and honesty. A novel fuzzy-logic
trust model for securing grid resources was put forth by Song et al. [31]. They have as well
built a SeGO scheduler that aids in trusted grid resource allocation. A reputation-based trust
supporting framework that encompasses a coherent adaptive trust model for quantifying and
comparing the trustworthiness of peers on the basis of a transaction-based feedback system,
and a decentralised implementation of such a model over a structured P2P network was
illustrated by Xiong and Liu [39]. A brief review of the contemporary state of Globus was
carried out by Foster [12]. The spotlight of the GT4 release should sound interesting to those
who aspire to work with the software.
Tian et al. [33] presented the ARTrust, an Attack Resistant Trust management model,
which is a novel recommendation on the basis of trust model for P2P networks. A trust
model used to compute and compare the trustworthiness of entities in the same autonomous
and different domains was proposed by Ma et al. [21]. This model proffers various methods
to handle the problems of users and related resources belonging to the identical or diverse
domains. Ranaldo and Zimeo [26] put forth a framework for brokering of grid resources,
virtualised through web services wherein a dynamical configuration is possible with respect
to multiple syntactic and semantic description languages and related matching strategies.
Shi et al. [29] described a novel anonymous coordination authentication scenario capable of
providing efficient and reliable anonymous identity authentication and remote platform
attestation for grid computing systems. Lohr et al. [20] illustrated an approach to improve
the grid security with the aid of a combination of trusted computing and virtualisation
technologies. Abawajy et al. [1] have proposed an approach that makes use of credit score
and reputation score to manage creditworthiness and trustworthiness of the Grid Service
Customer and GSP, respectively.
In grid security literature, the researchers have utilised trust and reputation for
providing security in various aspects of grid computing. Recently, very few researchers
have made use of both trust and reputation for providing security to grid resources. In the
V. Vijayakumar et al.4
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analysis of grid security literature, no one solution is perfect for every grid. In this article,
we have designed an efficient approach by amalgamating both trust and reputation in the
selection of grid resources to execute the jobs securely.
3. Trust and reputation
This section encompasses a foreword of trust and reputation in the context of grid
computing.
3.1 Trust
Trust acts as the basis for both human society and cyberspace security. Every one of us is
conscious about the importance of trusting somebody. The nature of trust is generally
decentralised owing to the fact that the parameters of trust are frequently personal. Trust
can be termed as the confidence that a particular party would work in an expected manner
despite monitoring or controlling the party. Commonly, trust is considered positive and
produces a good outcome in indecisive circumstances. Trust is not a black and white
substance. Often, there exists a grey area in conveying the trustworthiness of a computer
site [30]. Like the human relationships, trust is as well denoted by a linguistic term rather
numerically. Trust varies in accordance with time and environment. The idea of trust is a
complex subject associated with a solid faith in attributes, for example, reliability, honesty
and competence of the trusted entity. The definition of trust as given by Azzedin and
Maheswaran [3] is as follows: trust is the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act
as expected such that the firm belief is not a fixed value associated with the entity but
rather it is subject to entity’s behaviour and applies only within a specific context at a given
time. The firm belief can be defined as a dynamic value, which is found to span over a set
of values varying from very trustworthy to very untrustworthy. The TF is developed on the
basis of earlier experiences and is provided for a particular context. The TF is associated
with a given time instance, as the trust level involving two entities is not essentially the
same for today when compared to a year ago.
3.2 Reputation
Of late, with its extensive application in e-commerce and online communities, reputation
mechanisms have turned out to be one of the chief techniques underpinning the distributed
application and system safety, for its enhanced scalability and flexibility. Owing to the fact
that one can trust another on basis of good reputation, the latter plays a significant role in
building trust. Reputation is defined as a measure of trustworthiness in the sense of
reliability. Reputation systems [23] proffer a scheme for creating trust through social
control devoid of trusting third parties. By means of community-based feedback about past
experiences of entities, reputation mechanisms offer a scheme for building trust through
social control. This aids in arriving at suggestions and judgement on quality and
consistency of the transactions [27]. According to Azzedin and Maheswaran [3],
reputation of an entity is defined as an expectation of its behaviour based on other entities’
observations or information about the entity’s past behaviour at a given time.
4. Secured resource selection for scheduling jobs
This section details the proposed approach for resource selection deliberated for secure
scheduling of independent and individual jobs to grid sites. The wide range of resources and
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems 5
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the strangeness of entities serve as difficulties during the process of resource selection.
Owing to the fact that a high-proficient society is not capable of getting along with a high-
trustworthy social relationship, it is impossible to attain efficient resource sharing in Grid
without certain trust relationship core. It is possible for entities to rely on other entities for
the information regarding a particular entity while arriving at trust-based decisions. This
can be achieved by a reputation mechanism. With due concern over the aforesaid
conditions, an approach is proposed by incorporating both trust and reputation. This
approach aims for secure scheduling of incoming jobs to the available resource sites based
on the TF value. The TF value of each resource site is determined with the aid of its SPC and
reputation weightage acquired from user community regarding its past behaviour. There
are two essential postulations that are made: (a) all resource sites have prior agreements to
participate in the grid operations and (b) the grid sites truthfully report their SPC to grid
organisation manager (GOM). Selfish grids [18] have not been dealt with in the proposed
scheme. The functionality diagram of the proposed approach is depicted in Figure 1.
4.1 Self-protection capability
The SPC of the entities in a grid organisation is determined by the GOM. Now and then,
every entity reports its SPC trustfully and truthfully to the GOM. An aggregation of the
values of the security factors given below is employed in determining the SPC of an entity.
The value of security factors differs in the range between 0 and 1 and is assigned to these
security factors based on the software utilities and frameworks utilised by them in the
provision of enhanced security. For example, the security factor ‘Anti-virus capabilities’
will be given based on the anti-virus software used in that grid entity. A grid entity with
highly efficient anti-virus software will have greater value for the security factor ‘Anti-
virus capabilities’. Each and every entity in the grid environment has to update the values
of these security factors to the GOM.
. IDS capabilities. The capability of an entity to shield the system against host-based
and network-based intrusions.
. Anti-virus capabilities. The capability of an entity to secure against viruses and
malicious codes.
. Firewall capabilities. The capability to guard the entity from other network
accesses.
. Authentication mechanism. The capability of the mechanism to authenticate an
identity claimed by or for a system security.
. Secured file storage capabilities. The capability of an entity to securely store the
files required for the execution of job.
. Interoperability. The capability of an entity to confine the interfacing amid
concurrent jobs.
. Secured job execution. The capability of an entity to ensure the secure execution of
a job.
. Authorisation mechanism. The mechanism employed by an entity to determine the
level of access, a specific authenticated user should be provided to secure resources
controlled by the entity.
On the basis of their significance to the security of grid entities and grid environment, a
weightage value will be allocated to all the security factors and, eventually, the values are
aggregated to calculate the SPC. The weightages of these security factors will be given by
the user based on the superiority of those factors in the grid environment. For instance,
V. Vijayakumar et al.6
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firewall, anti-virus, IDS capabilities and more play a vital role in every grid entity. On the
basis of their priority needs, the relevant security attains the maximum weightage. As
firewall plays an important role in the security of grid entity, a high-weightage value 0.9 is
given to the security factor ‘Firewall capabilities’. Table 1 provides the weightage
allocated to security factors.
The SPC is calculated using the following Equation (1):
SPC ¼
Xn
i¼1
WðiÞ*AðiÞ; ð1Þ
where n is the total number of factors, W is the weightage and A(i) is the value of the factor.
Figure 1. Functionality diagram of the proposed approach.
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems 7
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4.2 Reputation computation
Given that reputation is a multi-faceted concept [37], there are numerous aspects in it, for
instance, truthfulness, honesty and the like. The reputation weightage of an entity is
determined on the basis of the feedback provided by both the user community and other
entities in the grid, regarding the entity’s security characteristics and their previous
experiences. On completion of a job, the user will offer feedback on the attributes to the
reputation manager (RM) according to their experience. Similarly, the entities in the grid
provide feedback to the RM on a timely basis. The value of feedback lies in the range
between 0 and 1. The feedback given by the users and the entities are aggregated and
employed in this approach. The feedback values are entered based on the users’
satisfaction of their tasks. The security attribute that fulfil the users’ task with higher
satisfaction gets the maximum feedback value. In addition, an effective approach for
assessing the feedback given by the user is presented in Section 4.4. The reputation
weightage is determined using the algorithm given in Section 4.2.1. The RM in grid
organisation contains the reputation weightage of every entity. The security attributes
taken into account for the reputation weightage calculation are listed below.
. Consistency. The capability of an entity to perform the expected functions of
understated conditions for a specified period in time.
. Confidentiality. The capability of keeping information from being disclosed to
unauthorised users.
. Truthfulness. The capability of the entity to make certain that the data are secured
from illegal modifications.
. Security. The capability of the system to offer security for job execution and file
storage.
. Privacy. The capability to keep some information exclusively to oneself.
. Non-repudiation. The inability to perform a specific action and later refuse that they
were indeed accountable for the event.
. Authentication. The process of validating an identity alleged by or for a system
entity. An authentication process encompasses two steps, which are identification
and verification.
. Authorisation. The process of granting privileges to processes and, eventually,
users. This varies from authentication, just verifies the identity of a user. With
reliable identification, the privileges, rights, property and permissible actions of the
user are determined by authorisation.
. Reliability. The probability of all the programmes involved in the grid system to
execute successfully.
Table 1. Weightage of security factors.
Security factors Weightage (W)
IDS capabilities 0.825
Anti-virus capabilities 0.85
Firewall capabilities 0.9
Authentication mechanism 0.8
Secured file storage capabilities 0.7
Interoperability 0.6
Secured job execution 0.75
Authorization mechanism 0.87
V. Vijayakumar et al.8
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. Robustness. The capability of a system in surviving the attacks intended towards
that system.
4.2.1 Algorithm for reputation weightage calculation
The aggregated feedback of all the security attributes of an entity is denoted in the form of
a reputation vector (RV),
RV ¼ ½SA1; SA2; . . . . . . ; SAn;
where n is the total number of security attributes.
The aggregated feedback of all the entities in the grid domain is represented as a
reputation matrix (RM) as given below. Every row in RM denotes the reputation vector RV
of an entity.
RM ¼
SA11 SA12 SA13 . . . . . . SA1j
SA21 SA22 SA23 . . . . . . SA2j
SAi1 SAi2 SAi3 . . . . . . SAij
2
664
3
775;
where i denotes the number of entities and j denotes the number of attributes.
The reputation weightage of each entity is determined by considering its relativity
with other entities in the grid domain through the construction of a relativity matrix.
The relativity matrix is formed as follows:
RelMat ¼
wðE1;E1Þ wðE1;E2Þ wðE1;E3Þ . . . . . . wðE1;EnÞ
wðE2;E1Þ wðE2;E2Þ wðE2;E3Þ . . . . . . wðE2;EnÞ
wðE3;E1Þ wðE3;E2Þ wðE3;E3Þ . . . . . . wðE3;EnÞ
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
wðEn;E1Þ wðEn;E2Þ wðEn;E3Þ . . . . . . wðEn;EnÞ
2
6666666664
3
7777777775
;
where n is the number of entities and wðEa;EbÞ denotes the relativity between the entities
Ea and Eb and is determined by Equation (2)
wðEa;EbÞ ¼
1; Ea . Eb
0; Ea , Eb
0:5; Ea ¼ Eb
8><
>:
9>=
>;
: ð2Þ
Ultimately, the reputation weightage is determined with the aid of the following
Equation (3):
RWðEaÞ ¼
Xn
b¼1
wðEa;EbÞ: ð3Þ
The advantage of the relativity matrix utilised for reputation weightage computation is
that it takes into consideration the user feedback of the same entity along with its
applicability among other entities. More precisely, the selection of the secure grid entity not
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems 9
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only depends on its user feedback but also depends mainly on its reputation applicability
with respect to the other grid entities. Here, for finding the relativity in between the grid
entities, we make use of relational operators that test some kind of relation between two
entities. On the basis of the numerical equality (e.g. 5 ¼ 5) and inequalities (e.g. 4 . 3 and
4 , 3), we have given the relativity for two grid entities that obtain different weightage such
as 0, 0.5 and 1 to ensure its security importance compared with its pair. Finally, the
advantage of taking the arithmetic addition of the relativity corresponding to one grid entity
is that it derives the relativity values to the central tendency of a sample space so that the
integrated reputation weightage value for the entity can be easily obtained.
4.3 TF calculation and resource selection
The TF of every entity is determined by means of the SPC and reputation weigthage (RW)
computed in the above sections by employing the following Equation (4).
TFðEaÞ ¼ SPCðEaÞ þ RWðEaÞ: ð4Þ
The following algorithm is employed in the selection of the resource for the execution
of incoming jobs.
for each entity Grid domain
Obtain SPC from GOM
Obtain RW from RM
Calculate TF
end
[STF, Ind] ¼ DescSort(TF)
for all i jobs
Allocate Entity [Ind[i]] to job Ji
end
4.4 Novel approach for users’ feedback evaluation
After the completion of their jobs, the users will be prompted to provide a feedback about
the entity that accomplished their job. If the user is not a trusted person, the feedback given
by the user may be wrong. Sometimes, by mistake, the users may enter wrong values.
The above factors affect the calculation of the entities’ reputation weightage and are likely
to result in wrong selection of resources for job execution. This has necessitated the need
for evaluating user’s feedback before taking it into consideration. The feedback values of
an entity given by the users are evaluated based on the aggregated feedback available for
that entity. If the current feedback given by the user deviates from the existing feedback,
the current feedback values are not taken into consideration. Moreover, the users are
prompted to check the feedback values given by them. The steps in the novel approach
proposed for evaluating the user’s feedback are described below.
The existing feedback values and the current feedback provided by the user are
denoted as follows:
Existing feedback : EF ¼ Ef1 Ef2 Ef3 · · · Efn
h i
;
Current feedback : CF ¼ Cf1 Cf2 Cf3 · · · Cfn
h i
;
where n ¼ 10.
V. Vijayakumar et al.10
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Initially, the mean EF of the existing feedback values (EF) is computed using the
following Equation (5):
EF ¼
Xn
i¼1
EFðiÞ
n
: ð5Þ
Then, the individual values in the current feedback (CF) are subtracted from the mean
value (EF) to obtain ECF. The above process is stated in Equation (6).
½ECF ! absðEF 2 CFðiÞÞ: ð6Þ
The deviated values in the current feedback CF, provided by the user, are identified by
the following steps. Initially, a correlation matrix CM is formed for ECF as follows:
CM ¼
d00 d01 d02 · · · d0j
d10 d11 d12 · · · d1j
d20 d21 d22 · · · d2j
d30 d31 d32 · · · d3j
..
.
di0 di1 di2 · · · dij
2
6666666666664
3
7777777777775
;
where dij ¼ absðECFðiÞ 2 ECFðjÞÞ.
Afterwards, the value pairs in the correlation matrix CM for which the difference is
greater than a threshold value are selected and represented as Sp. The threshold value
is computed by multiplying the mean value ECF with 2. The aforesaid procedure is
formulated in Equations (7) and (8).
Thresh ¼ ECF £ 2; ð7Þ
Sp ¼ {ðx; yÞ : pðzÞ}; ð8Þ
where pðzÞ ¼ CMij . Thresh.
Finally, the frequent value in the formed set Sp is chosen and the feedback value
corresponding to it is identified as the deviated value. If any deviated value is identified,
the users are prompted to check the values given by them. On the basis of the user’s
response, the feedback is either considered or discarded.
5. Experimental results
In this section, we first describe the experimental set-up and present the results obtained
from our experimentation. This approach is implemented in Java. The experimental set-up
is composed of 10 grid entities and a GOM. Originally, the users submit their jobs to
GOM. The GOM computes the TF value of all the entities on the basis of their SPC and
reputation weightage. On the basis of the TF value, an entity with high TF value is chosen
for the execution of current job. The GOM notifies the user with the selected entity for
executing their job. On completion of the job, the user is prompted to provide a feedback
on the security attributes of the entity. The feedback values provided by the user have been
International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems 11
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
1:3
7 0
5 J
uly
 20
12
 
evaluated successfully using the novel approach presented. The SPC of all the entities is
periodically updated by the GOM.
The security factors made use of for computing the SPC of the 10 grid entities are
enlisted along with their corresponding values in Table 2. The security attributes that
ultimately help in the estimation of reputation weightage with their corresponding values
are listed subsequently in Table 3.
A relativity matrix obtained in this approach based on the values of the various security
attributes present in the foreshown table is given below. The relativity matrix thus
computed will be employed in the estimation of reputation weightage.
RelMat ¼
0:5 0:3 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:15 0:3 0:3 0:3 0:4
0:7 0:5 0:6 0:35 0:6 0:3 0:4 0:4 0:6 0:55
0:6 0:4 0:5 0:2 0:6 0:5 0:3 0:45 0:7 0:6
0:7 0:65 0:8 0:5 0:7 0:7 0:5 0:6 0:8 0:75
0:8 0:4 0:4 0:3 0:5 0:1 0:4 0:3 0:5 0:5
0:85 0:7 0:5 0:3 0:9 0:5 0:4 0:6 0:9 0:9
0:7 0:6 0:7 0:5 0:6 0:6 0:5 0:7 0:7 0:5
0:7 0:6 0:55 0:4 0:7 0:4 0:3 0:5 0:4 0:6
0:7 0:4 0:3 0:2 0:5 0:1 0:3 0:6 0:5 0:5
0:6 0:45 0:4 0:25 0:5 0:1 0:5 0:4 0:5 0:5
2
66666666666666666666664
3
77777777777777777777775
A brief description of the graphs is depicted in Figures 2–5. In the environmental set-
up mentioned, each entity in the grid is rated based on a set of security factors (SPC) and a
set of security attributes (reputation weightage). Here, Figure 2 portrays the values
associated with the different security factors with respect to every grid entity and Figure 3
visualises the values associated with the different security attributes with respect to every
grid entity at a specified time. The optimal selection of a secured grid entity from such a
complex selection criteria based on security factors and security attributes is a tough task.
This approach provides an effective means to determine the most secured entity among the
available entities during a particular point in time, under varying values of security
attributes. Similarly, Figures 4 and 5 depict the experimental results obtained at different
points in time. The dark line in Figures 2–5 represents the entity selected by the approach.
Table 2. Values of the security factors for 10 entities.
Entity IDSC AVC FC AM SFSC I SJE A
E1 0.25 0.54 0.56 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.56 0.68
E2 0.21 0.5 0.7 0.57 0.61 0.44 0.39 0.92
E3 0.6 0.37 0.89 0.51 0.67 0.73 0.79 0.1
E4 0.15 0.21 0.45 0.57 0.39 0.23 0.38 0.46
E5 0.15 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.7 0.7
E6 0.5 0.6 0.65 0.4 0.5 0.35 0.3 0.3
E7 0.51 0.42 0.5 0.56 0.7 0.4 0.61 0.21
E8 0.4 0.5 0.59 0.68 0.74 0.79 0.62 0.57
E9 0.6 0.37 0.89 0.51 0.67 0.73 0.79 0.61
E10 0.21 0.5 0.7 0.57 0.61 0.44 0.39 0.42
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Figure 2. Security factors graph with selected entity E5.
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Figure 3. Security attributes graph with selected entity E5.
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Figure 4. Security factors graph with selected entity E6.
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It is observable that the selected entity offers an optimal security for the execution of
job in it.
6. Conclusion
Modern scientific and developing applications make use an emerging realistic technique,
termed as computational grids. The triumphant and proficient utilisation of grid computing
facilities vitally necessitates highly sophisticated and secured resource management
systems. Moreover, accessing and sharing of resources necessitate the assurance of high
trustworthiness as an inevitable factor. Reputation mechanisms provide a way for creating
trust through social control with the assistance of feedback concerning the past
experiences. This research paper has presented an efficient approach for the selection of an
appropriate resource for the secured execution of the job. Security for the resource
selection procedure is offered by this approach by combining trust and reputation. This
approach aggregates a number of security-related attributes for both SPC and reputation
into numerical values that can aid in the determination of the TF of grid entity. Also, a
novel approach has been presented for evaluating the feedback provided by the users. This
approach has been proved to be efficient in choosing a secured entity from a pool of
available ones. Moreover, this approach manages the increase in the number of jobs as
well as the number of grids in a satisfactory manner.
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